We present an incentive-based architecture for providing recommendations in a social network. We maintain a distinct reputation system for each individual and we rely on users to identify appropriate correlations and rate the items using a system-provided recommendation language. The key idea is to design an incentive structure and a ranking system such that any inaccuracy in the recommendations implies the existence of a profitable arbitrage opportunity, hence making the system resistant to malicious spam and presentation bias. We also show that, under mild assumptions, our architecture provides users with incentive to minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the ratings and the actual item qualities, quickly driving the system to an equilibrium state with accurate recommendations.
INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems [1] are an important Internet monetization tool. They help in monetizing the heavy tail and play an important role in the success of Internet-based businesses. The primary task of a recommender system is to suggest items of interest to its users. To this end, any correlation information regarding the similarities among various products and among the interests of individual users may prove very useful. Social networking services, whose success provides a fertile field for web-based commercial activity, offer a rich collection of such information. Coupling these tools and exploiting the information extracted from social networks, facilitates the generation of high-quality personalized recommendations.
The approach of identifying similarities between users in the domain of social recommender systems has been applied in the form of collaborative filtering techniques. However, these systems make no guarantees about the quality of the recommendations. It has been experimentally observed [7] that in systems where individual decisions are influenced by the decisions of others, quality alone doesn't determine the success of an item. We refer to this phenomenon as presentation bias. Spam is another deterrent in the effective functioning of these systems [4, 6] . Since the owner of an item has much to gain from its success, there is an incentive for agents to game the system. Another approach, outlined by Bhattacharjee and Goel [2, 3] , is to use incentive-based mechanisms for making ranking systems robust to presentation bias and spam. The work there assumed a simple setting of homogeneous population, and had no provisions for the mechanisms to work in the framework of personalized social recommendations. In this paper, we consider recommendations in this more complex landscape. We also show that under mild assumptions, the architecture we present provides users with incentive to minimize the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the ratings and the item qualities, leading to a fast convergence to an equilibrium state with high-quality recommendations.
THE INSPECT-UTILIZE MODEL
We break down a typical interaction of a user with her personalized reputation system into three steps. (1) In the first step, the system provides the user with a ranked list of recommended items (e.g. books). (2) Next, the user chooses to inspect the top j items. (3) Finally, among these items, the user utilizes a subset S (in the book example, purchases some of the books) and we say that a utility generation event has occurred for the items in S. We now present a model which captures this interaction. The set E = {1, 2, . . . , n} models the n items and the set U = {1, 2, . . . , m} models the m users of the system. The users interact with their individual reputation systems and may also update the ratings of the items. The model specifics follow.
1. Quality. We define as qe,u, the probability that user u utilizes item e, conditioned on the fact that u has inspected e. We will refer to this probability as the quality of e with respect to user u. The task of the system is to give, for each user, an ordering of the items according to their quality with respect to the user. The actual value of qe,u is unknown.
2. Slots. The k slots, 1, 2, . . . , k are the placeholders for the recommendations that are presented to each user. We assume that the probability with which user u inspects slot i is known and denote it by pi,u. Obviously, it is the case that p1,
3. Utility. If user u utilizes an item e, we say a utility generation event has occurred. For simplicity, we will assume that all utility generation events result in the same revenue, R. This implies no loss of generality, since different revenue equivalents can be easily folded into the quality values.
OUR ARCHITECTURE
We now describe our feedback and incentive-based architecture which is designed in a way that users benefit from correcting the rankings.
1. Social graph. The users are organized in a social graph G with one node for very u ∈ U and edges between related individuals.
2. Feedback scores. Each of the m personalized reputation systems maintains n feedback scores, one for each item. For every user u ∈ U and for every item e ∈ E, τe,u is the feedback score of e in the personalized reputation system of user u, which is not allowed to drop below 1.
3.
Tokens. In our model, a rater (user) is able to alter the scores τe,u by placing tokens. A token Ti is a tuple {u, e, r}, where u is the rater who places the token, e the item on which the token is placed, and r a token vector. The token vector r has m elements and each element ru is the increase/decrease of τe,u. Restrictions on the possible token vectors used are imposed by the recommendation language (details below). The order of arrival of tokens is given by subscript i. A constraint is that at any given time the sum of the contributions made by a user is bounded by γ which is a system parameter. This means that, after placing her first few tokens, a user has to make negative contributions to some scores, in order to gain the right of making future positive contributions.
4. Recommendation language. For any u ∈ U, the system defines a set, Lu, of allowed recommendation vectors. These m sets constitute the recommendation language. A vector r = (r1, r2, . . . , rm) ∈ Lu, must be a non-negative vector whose elements have unit sum.
The token vectors used by u are scaled recommendation vectors. This means u can use vector αr, where α is a positive or negative real number, as a token vector if and only if r ∈ Lu. For the rest of the paper, with a slight abuse of language and notation, we allow the token vectors of user u to be linear combinations of the recommendation vectors in Lu.
5. Revenue distribution. The fraction of the revenue to be distributed as incentive among the users is determined by parameter β ≤ 1. The parameter s > 1 controls the relative importance of tokens placed earlier on an item (to incentivize discovery of new items and deal with presentation bias). Suppose a utility generation event occurs for an item e by user u, and results in R amount of revenue being generated for the system. Let T be the set of all the tokens in the system. For a given token Ti = {u , e, r} ∈ T , we define w(Ti) as the weight by which τe,u was changed due to Ti. If Ti was placed on item e, then w(Ti) = ru, otherwise w(Ti) = 0. Further, we define, W (Ti) = 1 + P T j ∈T :j≤i w(Tj), as the value of τe,u after Ti was placed. The revenue share of the rater who placed token Ti (user u ) is given by
This definition ensures that the total shared revenue is bounded by βR and that the share of a rater does not depend on future tokens. For each u, we maintain an account accu. Depending on the sign of the revenue share, the amount is added or subtracted from accu. The situation arising from bankruptcy of a user has been discussed in [3] .
MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. We define as visibility of item e for user u, the probability with which e is inspected by u, after being ranked in her recommendations and denote it ηe,u. The expected rate at which revenue is generated for an item e, by user u, is given by ηe,uqe,u. Let,
Note that f is proportional to the profit (or loss) that the rater can expect to make by making an instantaneous positive (or negative) contribution to the feedback score of item e, in the reputation system of user u (since it is proportional to the derivative of the revenue sharing expression from Section 3). Our structure uses the ranking algorithm described by Bhattacharjee and Goel in [3] , which has the following properties. , where s > 1 is the same as earlier.
3. Under mild assumptions (see [3] ), the ranking algorithm ensures ηe,u = λτe,u, for all e ∈ E and u ∈ U, where λ is a constant. Since s > 1, this subsumes the last property (when the assumptions hold). Briefly and informally the assumption states that the vector of normalized ratings is majorized [5] by the vector of normalized slot inspection probabilities.
Now, using f , we will explain the notion of a profitable arbitrage opportunity. 
The inequality means that the user has instantaneous profit when making those recommendations and the equality guarantees that the recommendation are compliant with the γ bound on the sum of the user's contributions (equal negative and positive contributions).
We now define the notion of an inverted ranking in the recommendations.
Definition 2. We say that the pair (e, e ) is a case of an inverted ranking in the recommendations for some user u, if qe,u < q e ,u and ηe,u ≥ η e ,u .
At this point, we will define the notion of a complete recommendation language. 
For every user u, I = (
That is, we expect that the recommendation language allows any user to place a recommendation for every user in the system. We now give the following theorem, which relates any inaccuracy in the recommendations with a profitable opportunity for the users. Theorem 1. Assuming that the recommendation language is complete, the existence of an inverted ranking pair (e, e ) in the recommendations for some user u, implies the existence of a profitable arbitrage opportunity for some user.
Proof. Since (e, e ) is an inverted ranking pair in the recommendations for u, we have qe,u < q e ,u and ηe,u ≥ η e ,u . Combining this with the properties of the ranking algorithm, mentioned earlier in this section, we get f (e, u) < f (e , u). This means the function f is not constant for all pairs (e, u). Let (e h , u h ) = arg maxe,u f (e, u) and (e l , u l ) = arg mine,u f (e, u). We also know that the recommendation language is complete, so we will write αu,r, βu,r for the multipliers that give, X u X r∈Lu αu,rr = 1u h and
We now examine the vector P u P r∈Lu αu,rr. Since it is equal to 1u h , it follows that the sum of its elements is equal to 1, hence we get
From the definition of an allowed recommendation vector, we know that the elements of every r have unit sum. Which gives us, P u P r∈Lu αu,r = 1. Using the same argument we get the same result for the multipliers The set U = {1, 2, . . . , m} models the m users of the system, who perform the role of inspecting the recommendations and, potentially, utilizing the items.βu,r as well. So,
Now consider that some user u performs the following recommendations. Initially, u applies the token vector P r∈Lu αu,rr on item e h (we will call this Recommendation 1) to get instantaneous profit, X r∈Lu αu,r
Next, u applies the token vector − P r∈Lu βu,rr on item e l (Recommendation 2) to get instantaneous profit,
Finally, u applies the token vectorˆP r∈Lu (βu,r − αu,r)˜I on some arbitrary item e (Recommendation 3) to get instantaneous profit, " X r∈Lu (βu,r − αu,r)
Observe that the sum of the contributions made by u is exactly 0, hence, there is no danger in violating the γ limit on the sum of the contributions. We claim that there is some user u, such that the sum of her instantaneous profits for placing recommendations 1, 2, and 3 is positive and, thus, there exists a profitable arbitrage opportunity for u. We will prove this by showing that if we take the sum of the instantaneous profits (3), (4), (5), and sum it over all u, we get a positive number. Starting with summing (3) for all u and combining with (1), we get that the sum of the instantaneous profits Recommendation 1 is,
Similarly, for Recommendation 2, from (1) and (4) we get,
Finally, for Recommendation 3, summing (5) for all u and combining with (2), we get,
Now, summing expressions (6), (7), and (8), we get that the sum of the instantaneous profits that each user would have by placing recommendations 1, 2, and 3, unilaterally, is f (e h , u h ) − f (e l , u l ) > 0.
We now prove a conditional theorem which implies that at equilibrium the feedback scores are correlated with the quality scores. The precondition refers to the mild assumptions given in the description of the algorithm in [3] and mentioned in the beggining of this section. We now focus on the quadratic incentive scheme, that is, the case s = 2. Consider the following potential function,
qe,u log τe,u.
Notice that if we interpret q and τ as distributions, then the above potential function is equivalent to the KullbackLeibler divergence (remember that q is fixed), which is,
qe,u log qe,u τe,u .
In the light of this observation, the next theorem says that it is most profitable for users to leave feedback which provides the most additional information relative to the current state of the system, leading to an equilibrium where all items are correctly rated for all users. Proof. The proof presented here follows the proof of the famous Gibbs' inequality in information theory. However, for the sake of completeness, we give the details here.
Let Q = P e,u qe,u and T = P e,u τe,u (both Q and T are constant). We modify P to get,
qe,u Q log τe,uQ qe,uT .
Since qe,u's are fixed, P is minimized where P * is maximized, and vice versa. Note that log x ≤ x − 1, with equality if and only if x = 1. We get,
qe,u Q = 0.
Hence, the potential function P is uniquely minimized at τe,u = qe,u T Q
. The second part of the theorem follows from the observation that the partial derivative of P(q, τ ) with respect to τe,u is f (e, u).
DISCUSSION
At this point, we conclude the paper with a discussion of how our scheme might be applied in practical systems. Consider a Netflix-like recommender system and an underlying social structure. The set of items is the set of movies and the social graph is given by the social structure. A recommendation can be made to all users who like sci-fi movies, or to all those belonging to a specific age group. Also, some user, who might know a user u (a friend) well, can specifically recommend a movie to u. All those recommendations can be made possible by including the appropriate vectors in the recommendation language. Every user interacts with a designed interface, which presents options compatible with human intuition and then translates the user's selections into recommendation vectors. The recommendation language can also be used to capture correlations between the interests of individual users, given from collaborative filtering techniques. The quality of a movie with respect to a user is the probability that the user rents a movie conditional on the fact that she inspects the recommendation.
